Upcoming OHE Seminars: MCDA and R&D Productivity

OHE invites you to join us for two lunchtime seminars in early December.

On 7 December, Prof Larry Philips of LSE will report on the development of MCDA by the EMA’s Benefit-Risk Project, an effort he has been leading.  Using case studies, he will explain how MCDA can be used to improve both the quality and transparency of decision making.  Click here for more information and to register.

On 8 December, Prof Massimo Riccaboni, University of Trento, will present the results of the groundbreaking analysis he published recently on the relationship between shifts in investment to more difficult areas of science and productivity in R&D in the pharmaceutical industry. He also will report results comparing productivity of US- and European-based companies, discussing the implications for EU R&D and industrial policy.  Click here for more information and to register.

We look forward to your participation.

Antibacterials: Roundtable Addresses the Critical Issues

Antibacterial drug resistance is a serious and growing worldwide problem that threatens our ability to cure traditionally treatable diseases and to successfully perform numerous surgical procedures that rely on antibacterials. The current situation is due primarily to two causes: inappropriate use in humans and animals, and the decline in the development of new antibacterials, largely because of lower returns on investment in R&D.

OHE has been very involved in both defining the challenge and thinking through possible responses. Earlier this year, OHE launched its publication, New Drugs to Tackle Antimicrobial Resistance: Analysis of EU Policy Options and also hosted a roundtable with a number of stakeholders. The objective of the roundtable was to create a consensus around the critical issues involved in constructing a framework that can encourage antibacterial R&D, identify potential obstacles to the implementation of such a framework and discuss how best to move forward. Participants included the European Commission, Member State governments, biopharmaceutical companies, ReAct, advocacy groups, and independent economists with expertise in the area. A summary of the key issues and the deliberations of the day are available in OHE’s most recent Seminar Briefing publication, available for download and summarised below.

New Drugs to Tackle Antimicrobial Resistance: Analysis of EU Policy Options points out that the challenges for antibacterial R&D are unlike those for most other therapeutic areas. The appropriately high revenues that are necessary to encourage the development of new drugs, including antibacterials, can be generated either from prices or volume of use. In the case of antibacterials, third party payers currently are reluctant to accept sufficiently high prices; high volume can contribute to the development of resistance that, in turn, will reduce volume. OHE’s report makes two recommendations, not mutally exclusive, for addressing this market failure: (1) a hybrid approach of push and pull incentives that both stimulate R&D and ensure appropriate use to minimise resistance, and (2) an up-front payment or ‘prize’ in the form of an Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) or a transferable (wildcard) IP extension for the successful development of novel antibacterials.

The morning discussion about the OHE report raised several points: (1) action will need to be taken at the Member State, rather than the EU, level on core challenges such as accelerated review, improved health technology assessment (HTA), and pricing and reimbursement (P&R) reforms, (2) AMCs create incentives only in the markets to which they are applied and the inclusion of a ‘tail price’ strengthens incentives to increase volume that could cause further development of resistance, (3) transferable IP extensions may have unintended consequences that could pose a burden to patients and distort the markets to which they are applied by affecting competition, (4) European priority review vouchers (PRVs) are a possible alternative to transferable IP extensions and theoretically could have a positive effect, and (5) the pharmaceuticals industry’s openness to new approaches that separate financial returns from volume of sales represents a historic opportunity.

In the afternoon, EFPIA sponsored a roundtable discussion that focused on what would be required politically and technically to design and implement a new model for antibacterial R&D.

Politically, the support of the Swedish government and the leadership of ReAct have succeeded in drawing attention to the issue of antibacterial resistance and framing the debate. The roundtable agreed that the European Commission is best placed to assume leadership now and, in fact, has been active already through its Framework Programme and collaboration with the US in TATFAR. The Commission is developing a five-year plan, to be announced shortly, that will emphasise the need for innovation sooner rather than later.

The roundtable identified an important list of other stakeholders that should be involved, including Member States’ HTA and P&R agencies; the pharmaceutical industry, both large corporations and small-to-medium-size entities (SMEs), whose needs along the value chain may differ; NGOs; academic experts; veterinary and animal health companies; health care professionals; and patient and consumer groups.

Developing an effective ‘new’ R&D model for antibacterials faces a number of technical challenges. Those discussed by the roundtable included the following.

  • Scientific challenges include not just the science per se, but also encouraging the creation of a new generation of experts and greatly increasing collaboration within and across research organisations, both public and private.
  • De-linking sales volume from financial returns is important to slowing the development of resistance; no clear approach to achieving this was identified by the roundtable.
  • Stewardship is essential, i.e., measures that effectively both minimise inappropriate use and ensure appropriate use. The roundtable was divided about how prominent a role the EU should play outside its borders. Other issues raised included the danger of stewardship being a screen for anticompetitive behavior, the need to include generics, and the possibility of a tax on newly-generic antibiotics to raise funds for R&D and/or training in appropriate use.
  • Market signals can indicate to pharmaceutical companies what products are most likely to be accepted by payers and also might be used to encourage stewardship, if workable ways to implement that could be devised. A more radical proposal was a third party payer patent buy-out that leaves the health care system entirely responsible for appropriate use.
  • Reforms in the regulatory process could have a significant effect on the economic expectations of pharmaceutical companies considering antibacterial R&D, in part by reducing uncertainty and minimising costs. Two areas in particular were identified as important: (1) the need for greater consistency in the regulatory requirements of the FDA and the EMA and (2) improving the development and regulatory processes for antibacterials specifically. The possibility of trading off additional post-approval research for earlier market access (e.g., after Phase II) was discussed, with parallels to other therapeutic areas noted.
  • Openness and greater collaboration can speed the process of discovery and development, an approach that has worked in other industries and is taking place to some extent now for antibacterials. The roundtable agreed that a useful first step would be a mapping exercise to better define the current state of play and knowledge about collaborative practices.

Moving forward as quickly as possible is in the interest of all parties. In the short run, the focus might be on implementing a strong incentive, based on the traditional model, to reignite R&D in this area. In the long run, the focus should be on addressing the more fundamental and systemic problems with antibacterial R&D. The pharmaceutical industry clearly is prepared to play its part, and to be flexible in so doing. With the new Commission action plan due very soon, now is the time for all stakeholders to engage.

Download Sharma, P. (2011) Summary report of the OHE/EFPIA antibacterial roundtable. Seminar Briefing. (9). London: Office of Health Economics.

New: Operationalising Value Based Pricing

Operationalising Value Based PricingRecent reforms to the National Health Service (NHS) in England include important changes in the regulation of prices for new medicines. From January 2014, the existing Pharmaceutical Pricing Regulation Scheme (PPRS) will be replaced by “value based pricing” (VBP) for branded medicines sold to the NHS. This will apply only to new medicines; those marketed before 2014 will continue to be governed by the PPRS.

To date, the UK Government has not been specific about how VBP will be implemented, but has indicated that calculations of value will extend beyond the QALY approach currently used by NICE.  The Department of Health has stated that it will include “the range of factors through which medicines deliver benefits for patients and society”.

In this OHE Research Paper, the authors identify and describe the full set of possible means by which value based pricing might be operationalised, categorise these by developing a taxonomy of approaches, and provide an initial assessment of the challenges, pros and cons of each.  They review the elements of value that could be considered and how these might be measured and valued,  combined into an overall assessment of a medicine’s value, and then linked to the maximum price the health service is willing to reimburse.  Finally, the means by which VBP is currently operationalised in a selection of countries is examined; both these and proposals for the UK are placed in the context of the taxonomy.

Download Sussex, J., Towse, A. and Devlin, N. (2011)  Operationalising Value Based Pricing of Medicines: A Taxonomy of Approaches. OHE Research Paper. London: Office of Health Economics.

Incorporating Multiple Criteria in HTA

What a health care system should pay for depends, of course, on the health gain that results. Health technology assessment (HTA) and cost-effectiveness analysis have become the core for many such decisions — by NICE in the UK and by similar bodies elsewhere. Other factors, however, also are taken into account by the governments and insurers that fund health care. These typically include: the impact of decisions on social equity; the quality of the patient experience; ramifications for the wider economy; and the quality of evidence required for decision making. The purpose of this OHE monograph is to inform and stimulate debate about the way different sorts of evidence and considerations are taken into account in decisions about new health care technologies.

Awareness of the importance of incorporating a number of considerations into decisions about resource allocation in health care, and many other fields, has given rise to ‘multiple criteria decision analysis’ (MCDA). This is defined by the authors of this monograph as ‘A set of methods and approaches to aid decision-making, where decisions are based on more than one criterion, which make explicit the impact on the decision of all the criteria applied and the relative importance attached to them’. This book is an invaluable primer on MCDA, explaining what MCDA is and how it can be used in health care. It includes examples of the use of this approach in areas of the UK public sector other than health, by local NHS organizations, and in health system decision-making in other countries. Both the advantages of using MCDA and its costs and risks are identified.

The authors argue for greater use of MCDA as an aid to decision-making that is based on HTA, both in the NHS and in other countries. MCDA encourages a valuable discipline in requiring the explicit identification and weighting of the criteria that used to make health care resource allocation decisions. This approach also increases transparency, making it easier to hold decision makers accountable for the choices they make on behalf of the public; this should lead to greater public confidence in the decisions that result, according to the authors.

The report will be of value to anyone interested or involved in the policy and practice of health technology appraisal and, more generally, to anyone involved in resource allocation in health care.

Download Devlin, N.J. and Sussex, J. (2011) Incorporating multiple criteria in HTA: Methods and processes. London: Office of Health Economics

Value-Based Pricing: OHE Comments

In December 2010, the UK Department of Health released a consultation document to elicit comments on ‘proposals for a new value-based system of pricing medicines which aims to recognise and reward innovation. The document sets out the principles that would underpin the move to value-based pricing, outlines how the new system could work across the UK and seeks views on a number of key issues’. Responses were requested by 17 March 2011. (The Department of Health consultation document is available here.)

The OHE has submitted its comments and made the full text of its remarks available here.

Briefly stated, key issues addressed in our response include the following.

1. Value-based pricing (VBP) can, and should, exist side-by-side with other approaches such as the Patient Assess Schemes.

2. No approach to assessing value as a basis for pricing can be wholly mechanistic; as demonstrated in every other country that assesses the ‘value’ of medicines, an element of negotiation about price always is present.

3. ‘Innovation’ is not a ‘yes or no’ variable, but occurs along a continuum of various degrees of innovation. This perspective must underlie any VBP.

4. Discussions must include whether the UK has an obligation to price in a way that encourages innovation, not ‘free ride’ on other countries that do.

5. Full assessment of value must take full account of patients’ preferences and experiences as well as the wider benefits to society, not be limited to costs to the NHS.

6. A value assessment based on weighting quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), as suggested by the UK Department of Health, is not appropriate. Multiple criteria must be considered and include social value judgements, some of which will not be proportional to the incremental QALYs a medicine is judged to yield.

Because the issues and considerations raised by value-based pricing (VBP) are complex, we urge readers to download and read our response in full.

New Antimicrobial Drugs: EU Policy Options

Priya Sharma

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) to drugs, a natural and unavoidable consequence of treating infectious diseases, is a growing global public health threat. AMR reduces the chances of successfully treating patients with infectious diseases, thereby increasing the probability of complications, morbidity and mortality. The World Health Organization estimates that infectious diseases are the third leading cause of death in the European Union (EU).

In 2009, the EU emphasized the importance of encouraging the development of new antibacterials by releasing a commissioned report and holding an expert conference.  The EU Commission has been tasked with developing comprehensive proposals by the end of 2011. OHE has just released an OHE Occasional Paper, authored by Priya Sharma and Adrian Towse, that is intended to provide additional input into policy discussions.

The working paper reviews AMR’s implications for the burden of disease, the causes of AMR, the current state of the antibiotic development pipeline and the reasons antibiotic R&D has been de-emphasised by biopharmaceutical companies. Encouraging the development of new antibiotics requires understanding current disincentives. The authors identify four key sets of factors: (1) low returns in the market because of the availability of generics, the effects of HTA, the short duration of treatment, and aggressive price controls, (2) scientific challenges in antibiotic discovery, including the relative lack of success in using target-based approaches, (3) the regulatory environment, such as the uncertainty surrounding the clinical trial requirements in different countries, and (4) restrictions on antibiotics use that are wisely intended to minimize AMR, but also reduce incentives to develop new ones.

Sharma and Towse note that many of the disincentives that pharmaceutical companies face in the market for antibiotics are similar to those for: neglected diseases in developing countries; orphan drugs in developed countries; countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats; and evidence for paediatric drug use. The policies enacted or proposed to correct for these market failures may suggest workable solutions for antibiotic development.

Missing to date from policy discussions, however, has been an estimate of the size of the various incentives needed to increase the attractiveness of antibiotic development relative to other disease areas. This working paper develops a model that is then used to assess the push, pull and hybrid approaches that might be applied. In particular, the model is used to determine the size of the various incentives needed to encourage antibiotic R&D compared to other therapeutic drug classes. These approaches include advance market commitments, priority review vouchers and fast track options, intellectual property rights extensions, incentives similar to those for orphan drugs, and a ‘call option’. Potential savings from an effective set of incentives to develop new drugs to counter AMR would be very cost-effective, according to the authors’ calculations; they urge that further research be completed on potential lives saved.

Based on these analyses, Sharma and Towse express a preference for a hybrid push-pull policy similar to that used for orphan drugs. An alternative might be upfront payment for registration (rather than for volume of use) in the form of an advance market commitment ‘prize’, a priority review voucher or a transferable intellectual property extension. Each of these incentives would reward the launch of an effective drug, making actual volume of use less relevant.

Since AMR is global, the response to its challenges must be coordinated across continents. The authors recommend that the EU and the US continue the TransAtlantic Task Force dialogue with the objective of maximizing the synergies possible from adopting complementary incentives and to address any regulatory issues. Developing and effectively implementing incentives for developing new antibiotics, however, requires the continuing involvement of a broad range of countries and stakeholders, including the pharmaceutical industry. As the authors note, ‘Without full participation of all concerned parties, very little can and will be done to address the growing threat of AMR’.

Download Sharma, P. and Towse, A. (2010) New drugs to tackle antimicrobial resistance: Analysis of EU policy options. OHE Occasional Paper. London: Office of Health Economics.

Value Based Pricing in the UK

Every country around the globe struggles with attaining an appropriate balance between providing affordable health care and ensuring access to medical advances.  In a recent article in the British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, Prof Adrian Towse examines the issues from a UK perspective.  Managing and containing costs in the NHS is a perennial challenge.  Far less clear is how to accomplish this while still ensuring sufficient incentives for timely access to new medical therapies, particularly new medicines.  Health technology assessment, he believes, is an important tool, but only if used appropriately and within its limits.

In the UK, prices for medicines are guided by a voluntary agreement, renewed and revised periodically, between the government and the pharmaceutical industry, the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS).  Prior to the last round of negotiations, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published a report proposing that the PPRS profit-control approach be replaced by a ‘value based pricing’ (VBP) approach. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) would indicate prices at which a product would be cost effective in different patient subgroups; the Department of Health (DH) would then negotiate a price with the company.  In a second phase, NICE would be merged with its Scottish and Welsh equivalents and be given DH’s power to set prices for medicines when used by the NHS.  An explicit cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) threshold (not a range) would be negotiated periodically with the pharmaceutical industry under a VBP-PPRS agreement.

According to Prof Towse, ‘combining price setting with the scientific task of assessing cost and effects risks biasing NICE’s judgments’ and introducing political opportunism. From a short-term NHS perspective, a low price and the use of a new technology could be achieved by ensuring that NICE’s assessments are ‘”rigged” to justify demanding a lower price than the drug is worth to the NHS’.  Introducing such potential bias would substantially increase uncertainty for pharmaceutical companies.  Prof Towse provides a comprehensive overview in the article of the numerous uncertainties that companies face already.

The 2009 PPRS agreement maintained the separation between scientific review and price decision making, stating that ‘NICE does not negotiate, set or publicly indicate prices’.  Two new value-focused measures, both to be reviewed within two years, were agreed.  The first,  ‘Flexible Pricing’, provides for minimal DH involvement and an ‘automatic’ adjustment in UK list prices based on new evidence of clinical and cost effectiveness.  NICE’s review can veto a UK price increase for an existing indication, but not for a new one.  The second, Patient Access Schemes, entail the company and the DH agreeing on an arrangement for making available a medicine initially turned down by NICE — essentially a ‘fast track’ re-review. In the article, Prof Towse explores how any of the parties might seek to ‘game’ the new measures and the counters for such attempts.

Prof Towse also notes that, in discussions through the Office of Life Sciences since the PPRS agreement, a NICE-administered ‘innovation pass’ mechanism has been established.  In essence a form of conditional approval, this allows early access to a small number of new drugs with limited but highly positive initial evidence of efficacy.  These would be available for up to three years while additional evidence is collected, with a pre-agreed ‘exit strategy’ in the event of NICE non-approval.

Although it is far too early to draw conclusions about the value of these new approaches, Prof Towse notes that they can ‘lead to forms of “coverage with evidence development” in the UK that will enable patients to access medicines whilst underlying uncertainty about value is reduced’.  Getting ‘value based pricing’ right, he argues, is essential to timely access to new medicines for patients in the UK and to ensuring that the UK market remains part of companies’ R&D and portfolio management decisions.  ‘Getting it wrong, by resisting coverage with evidence development and introducing government price-setting, risks side-lining the UK’.  If the UK ceases to be an early launch market, access will be delayed, the NHS will become irrelevant in companies’ R&D decision making, and the UK’s biomedical science base will erode.

Towse, A. (2010) Value based pricing, research and development, and patient access schemes.  Will the United Kingdom get it right or wrong? British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology. 70(3), 360-366.

Defining Benefit Through Willingness to Pay

Since 2007, new medications may be paid for by the statutory health insurance funds (GKV) in Germany only if they are cost effective. Prof Peter Zweifel and Michèle Sennhauser of the University of Zurich have tested whether willingness to pay (WTP) can be used to define benefit. At a recent OHE lunchtime seminar, Prof Zweifel reviewed the results of their discrete choice experiment.

This research compared long-acting insulin (insulin detemir) to short-acting insulin across four attributes: risk of hypoglycaemia, weight gain, flexibility of injection time, and ease of preparation. Of the 1,100 individuals surveyed in face-to-face interviews, 600 were not diabetic, 200 had Type 1 diabetes, and 300 were Type 2 diabetics – half of whom were not treated with insulin. Two price attributes were included: copayment and increased contributions to health insurance.

Not surprisingly, the non-diabetics and those not treated with insulin showed a higher WTP when financing was through copayments; the other two groups, who would be immediately affected by access to the medicine, showed a higher WTP when financing was through increased contributions to health insurance. All survey participants, however, were willing to pay substantially more than the average cost of long-acting insulin. According to Prof Zweifel, this demonstrates that inclusion of long-acting insulin in the SKV list of benefits is justified.

The working paper describing this research is available online: http://www.soi.uzh.ch/research/wp/2009/wp0914.pdf